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Abstract
This paper examines the e¤ects of centralized presidential policy-making, imple-
mented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert
e¤ort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we
show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants.
Yet, total e¤ort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often
impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots") to quit rather than implement presiden-
tial policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureau-
crats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president
in the hope of tempering future policy when an allied president is elected. As con-
trol of the White House alternates between ideologically opposed extreme presidents,
policy-minded moderates are stripped from bureaucratic agencies leaving only policy
extremists or poorly performing "slackers." These departures degrade policy initiative
in moderate agencies.
I. Introduction
One of the hallmarks of post-WWII American government is the growth of a large
policy-making establishment under the direct control of the president. The ascendancy of
the O¢ ce of Management and Budget (OMB), the O¢ ce of Information and Regulatory
A¤airs (OIRA), the National Security Council (NSC), and the National Economic Council
(NEC), as well as the proliferation of special assistants, legal advisors and policy "czars,"
has enabled the executive to forcefully direct and alter a wide range of public policies (Burke
1992; Hart 1992; Rudalevige 2005; Schlesinger 1973). Presidents use executive orders, spe-
cial memoranda, and OIRA oversight to impose their will on the government, frequently
bypassing civil service advice and the agency notice and comment process (Cooper 2002).
Most recently, President Obamas attempt to alter immigration policy through executive
order highlights how the president may use these tools to centralize policy-making power.1
Indeed, presidents have strong incentives to centralize and control policy development: cen-
tralization assures policies congruent with the presidents interest, molds public opinion, and
boosts a presidents re-electability (Howell 2003; Moe 1985; Rudalevige 2002; Warber 2006).
Yet, presidential control of policy-making comes at a cost and can have larger implications
for the federal workforce and governmental performance.
In this paper, we study the e¤ects of centralized presidential policy making on work and
career incentives in federal agencies. We develop a model of authority in public organizations
that reects actorscommitment to policy, their rational decisions about work rates, and their
strategic calculations about careers. The paper examines how presidents, by centralizing
policy-making, disenhearten and demotivate policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots"), who
would otherwise willingly exert e¤ort and initiative to innovate new policy. Centralization
thus undermines bureaucratic initiative. However, the e¤ects of centralization are even more
deleterious. Zealots on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum from the president resign
their position because departing a¤ords them clean hands distasteful policies that will be
implemented regardless of the zealots presence or absence are less painful if the agent is not
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directly implicated in their administration. The model uncovers two dynamics mitigating
policy-induced departures. The rst, which we dub wait them out(WTO), occurs when
a zealous bureaucrat, faced with a hostile president who forces distasteful policy on the
agency, nonetheless stays because of the possibility of implementing a better policy under
a friendlier president in the future. It is extremist zealots opposed to the current president
who are most inclined to WTO, which requires a turn-over in party control of the presidency.
The second dynamic, which we call "I can make a di¤erence" (IMD) occurs when a very
moderate zealot, faced with a friendly president who insists on an extreme policy, remains
in the agency because she may be able to craft a more moderate policy under such a friendly
president in the future. It is moderate bureaucrats who are players in IMD, which requires
continuity in party control of the presidency.
Despite the WTO and IMD dynamics, policy-induced departures "quitting in protest"
are frequent among zealous civil servants. Policy-induced departures strip an agency of its
most motivated employees, those whose initiative generates new policies when the presidents
centralized apparatus fails to do so. Moreover, the model shows that in the longer run, as
party control of the presidency alternates and presidents press policies on agencies, the
departure of moderate zealous bureaucrats tends to hollow out the agencies. In starkest
form, only two types of civil servants remain in the government: highly motivated extremist
zealots on the left and right, and slackers in the middle who exert little e¤ort on policy
innovation.
We briey discuss some extensions to the analysis, for example, incorporating an oppo-
sition Congress or a skeptical judiciary, or the possibility of o¤ering bureaucrats "political
e¢ ciency wages" to o¤set the incentives for policy-induced departures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briey reviews the rise of centralized pres-
idential policy making and discusses studies of the ensuing incentive e¤ects. Section III
presents a model of presidential-bureaucratic interaction in which centralized presidential
policy-making has incentive e¤ects in the agencies. Section IV develops the WTO and IMD
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dynamics, studies the e¤ects of centralization on work e¤ort, and examines how alternat-
ing party control of the presidency hollows out agencies. Section V discusses the results
and briey explores extensions. Section VI o¤ers some conclusions. All formal results are
contained in Appendices.
II. The Centralized Presidency
Political scientists have carefully documented the rise and growth of the centralized
presidency (Schlesinger 1973; Rudalevige 2005). The Great Depression and Second World
War impelled a dramatic expansion of the administrative state and presidential power (Higgs
1987). Congress and the president created scores of programs and agencies sta¤ed by hun-
dreds of thousands of new federal employees. Concerned about a perceived weakness in
administration, President Roosevelt appointed the Presidents Committee on Administra-
tive Management (the Brownlow Committee) to make recommendations about how to im-
prove the administration of government. The Committee recommended the creation of a
permanent Executive O¢ ce of the President (EOP) and an expansion of the White House
sta¤. The Committee proposed that the Executive O¢ ce of the President include the White
House O¢ ce, along with its expanded sta¤, and other sta¤agencies such as the Bureau of the
Budget. To a great extent, these recommendations became reality (Burke 1992, Dickinson
1997, Hart 1992, Milkis and Nelson 2012). And, later presidents and Congresses continued
to expand the Executive O¢ ce of the President, adding new employees and units such as
the National Security Council and Council of Economic Advisers (Burke 2002). The expan-
sion of the EOP reects a frank admission by the nations policymakers that the role of the
president in the constitutional system has changed. As the scope, volume and complexity
of government work has expanded, Congress has increasingly delegated responsibility to the
executive establishment to solve national problems (Epstein and OHalloran 1999; Huber
and Shipan 2002).
The burgeoning of the institutional presidency allows presidents to play a much greater
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role in policymaking than formerly, often through increased control over budgets and leg-
islation but also through appointments and direct presidential action (Fisher 2000; Howell
2003; Lewis 2008; Neustadt 1954; Weko 1995). Most germane to this paper, a well-developed
literature examines how unilateral action by the president plays out in a separation of powers
context (Cooper 2002; Deering and Maltzman 1999; Howell 2003; Mayer 2001). This litera-
ture argues that the president, by administratively altering a status quo policy yet keeping
it within an expansive congressional gridlock region, can advance his policy interests while
assuring that Congress cannot o¤er an e¤ective legislative riposte. Thus the administrative
presidency emerges as a powerful tool of executive policy making (Nathan 1975; Waterman
2009, but see Chiou and Rothenberg 2014 for a partial demurral).
The extent of presidential centralized policymaking has varied from administration to
administration as well as across policy areas. This is no surprise since survey research,
both individual and expert, reveals signicant ideological variation across the agencies in the
executive establishment (see, e.g., Aberbach et al. 1981, Clinton et al 2012). Such variation
implies that the choice of whether to centralize or rely on a particular agency is apt to be
consequential for outcomes in a specic policy domain, and apt to di¤er in application across
presidents of di¤erent parties (Rudalevige 2002).
Despite its important insights about presidents use of unilateral policymaking, this
branch of the political science literature has placed little emphasis on the incentive e¤ects
on the agencies so often bypassed by the White House. In contrast, the incentive e¤ects of
centralized decision-making are a major theme in the literature on organizational economics.
This literature considers the issue as an incomplete contracting problem (Williamson 1975,
Williamson 1985) and examines how the allocation of managerial decision rights within and
across rms can have a substantial e¤ect on organizational performance (Grossman and Hart
1986; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999). Williamson extends the incomplete contracting
lens to include an analysis of public and private bureaucracies (Williamson 1999).
In an important contribution, Aghion and Tirole 1997 build on these ideas. Their classic
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analysis of authority in organizations develops a model of formal authority (who has the right
to decide) and real authority (who has e¤ective control over decisions). A subordinate may
have real authority because he maintains an information advantage over a superior, despite
the superior having formal decision rights. The superior can exercise control through her
decision rights, but then undercuts the initiative of the subordinate.
A small number of papers in political science pick up on these insights and incorporate
agency incentives in separation of powers games between agencies and other branches. One
strand argues that if courts frequently veto agency regulations, agencies will respond by
reducing their policy initiative (Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2007, Stephenson 2007).
Another strand examines these incentives in the context of Congress-agency interactions
(Gailmard and Patty 2007). This analysis shows how limited writs of statutory discretion
from Congress may discourage policy-oriented bureaucrats from investing in expertise and
may even induce them to leave the agency.
We extend this line of analysis to president-agency interactions. To do so, we adapt the
Aghion and Tirole model to presidential-agency relations. First, we ground the model in a
one dimensional policy space, so the principal has preferences over policy, as is foundational
in much analytical political science. Second, following the extensive literature on mission-
oriented government servants, we incorporate both "zealous" bureaucrats individuals who
care about policy and agency mission and "slackers", those who care only about wages and
not policy (Bertelli 2007; Dewatripont et al. 1999; Downs 1967; Gailmard and Patty 2007;
Perry and Wise 1990). Third, we allow the bureaucratic agent to quit his job due to policy
di¤erences with the political principal (Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Hirschman 1970; Lee and
Whitford 2008). Fourth, we extend the analysis to two periods so rst period bureaucrats
make decisions in the shadow of the future. Then, the rst period decisions of the principal
and agent a¤ect organizational performance in the second period. With this apparatus, we
study the e¤ects of centralized policy making on 1) policy-induced departures of personnel




A policy is a unilateral action undertaken by the Presidents administration, imple-
mented directly by the Bureaucrats agency at the direction of the President, for example
via an executive order, presidential memorandum, or presidential directive to the agency
(Moe and Howell 1999). We employ the standard formalization in which a policy, x, is a
point on a closed and bounded subset of the real line X = [ z; z]: A distinguished policy is
the status quo q = 0. The President is either L or R with policy utility  i(x; p) dened over
X with ideal policy p = ` < 0 if i = L and p = r > 0 if i = R. Bureaucrats are either slackers
or zealots; the former cares only about wage utility while the latter also derives utility from
policy, especially the implementation of an attractive policy. A zealous Bureaucrat B has
policy utility  B(x; b) and ideal policy b > 0. (There is a mirror set of bureaucrats with
ideal policies less than zero; the results below extend straightforwardly to the mirror cases.)
We employ subscripts to denote time periods, either 1 or 2. As in Aghion and Tirole 1997,
the probability of nding a policy innovation in Period t is eit 2 [0; 1] for the President and
eBt 2 [0; 1] for the Bureaucrat. In other words, the two actors must employ costly e¤ort to
uncover or search for policies. In the event of a successful search, an actor is able to distin-
guish the elements of the policy space. If a policy search fails, the actor cannot distinguish
the elements of the policy space other than q.2 Only the President can select a policy, so
the President has both formal and real authority (Aghion and Tirole 1997, Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy 1999).
The model has two periods; each period has seven stages. We assume an incumbent
zealous Bureaucrat at the start of Period 1. In Period 1:
1. Nature sets the status quo policy q = 0 and determines the winner of the presidential
election (either L or R) using common-knowledge probability :
2. The incumbent Bureaucrat B (a "zealot" in Period 1) and the elected President simul-
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taneously choose policy making e¤orts eB1 and e
i
1 (i = (L;R)) searching for a policy
initiative that the Bureaucrat can implement at the Presidents order via unilateral
executive action.
3. The policy searches of the Bureaucrat and the President succeed with probabilities eB1
and ei1 respectively.
4. B o¤ers the President a policy recommendation xB1 2 X = [ z; z]. If the Bureau-
crats policy search succeeded in Stage 3, Bs recommendation reveals  i(xB1 ) to the
President via hard information. If the Bureaucrat was not informed in Stage 3, the
Bureaucrat does not know the policy value of any policy (other than q) and hence the
policy recommendation reveals nothing to the President about the policy value of the
recommended policy.
5. The President chooses the nal policy xF1 2 X:
6. After the Presidents policy choice, B may either stay in the public service (g1 = 0) or
depart for the private sector, quitting in protest (g1 = 1). If B quits, she is replaced
by another bureaucrat (a "slacker") and xF1 is nonetheless implemented.
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7. Players receive per-period payo¤s.
Stages 1-7 repeat in Period 2 with either the same incumbent zealous bureaucrat if she
stayed in Period 1 or her slacker replacement if she exited.
B. Preferences and the Four Regions
In the model Presidents and zealous bureaucrats care about policy. We employ the
following single-peaked per-period policy evaluation function for the President and Bureau-
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crat4:
 i(x; p) = jp  qj   jp  xj
 B(x; b) = jb  qj   jb  xj
where i = (L;R) and p = ` < 0 if i = L and p = r > 0 if i = R:
Figure 1 illustrates these policy evaluation functions. The functions are normalized so
the policy value of the status quo q = 0 is zero for all players, that is  i(q) =  B(q) = 0:
As shown, each actor has a most-preferred policy, the argmax of  (x), respectively ` and
r for L and R and b for the Bureaucrat B. In addition, each President has a status-quo
equivalent policy ti = 2p, as does the Bureaucrat tB = 2b. A President (weakly) prefers
policies in the interval dened by q and ti to q and a Bureaucrat (weakly) prefers policies in
the interval dened by q and tB to q. Thus, there are a range of policies R and an R-side
bureaucrat both agree are preferable to the status quo but there are no policies L and an
R-side bureaucrat agree are preferable to the status quo.
It proves convenient to dene four regions in the policy space, dened by the relative
placements of the ideal policies of the R President and the Bureaucrat. The four regions are:
 Region 1: 0 < b < r=2."Very moderate bureaucrats". Implementation of Rs ideal
policy is worse for B than retention of the status quo q = 0. However, implementation
of Bs ideal policy is better for R than the status quo.
 Region 2: r=2  b  r:"Somewhat moderate bureaucrats." For both actors, implemen-
tation of the other actors ideal policy is better than the status quo. However, B is
somewhat more moderate than R.
 Region 3: r < b < 2r: "Somewhat extreme bureaucrats." For both actors, implemen-
tation of the other actors ideal policy is better than the status quo. However, B is
somewhat more extreme than R.
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Figure 1: Policy Utility for President and Bureaucrat. Utility for the President (L and R)
is show with solid lines, that of Bureaucrats with dashed lines. The ideal point of L is `
and that of R is r. The four regions of R-side bureaucrats are labeled. In addition, utility
functions for bureaucrats in each region are shown.
 Region 4: b  2r. "Very extreme bureaucrats". Implementation of Bs ideal policy is
worse for R than retention of the status quo. However, implementation of Rs ideal
policy is better for B than the status quo.
Also important is the hostile president conguration, in which ` < q  b for Bureaucrats
in all four regions. Figure 1 displays a policy evaluation function for a Bureaucrat in each
of the four regions as well as policy evaluation functions for L and R presidents.
The Bureaucrats utility depends not just on the policy evaluation function  B(x; b) but
also on wages w, whether the Bureaucrat is a slacker ( = 0) or a zealot ( = 1), whether she
has left her policy making job, and how hard she works if she remains in the public sector.
Specically
uB(x; eBt ; b; w; ) =
8><>:  
B(x; b) + win   c  eBt  if employed in the public sector
 B(x; b) + wout if employed in the private sector
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The parameter , 0   < 1, captures the "clean hands" phenomenon in which a zealous
bureaucrat is less sensitive to the impact of policies if she is not implicated in their admin-
istration. The function c() captures the cost of expending e¤ort searching for policies.
For simplicity and tractability we adopt several assumptions. First we assume  = 0,
so zealots who have exited have entirely clean hands. This allows us to focus neatly on the
key points about career decisions. Second, as in Gailmard and Patty (2007), we assume
slackers care only about their wages and are completely unmoved by the content of the
policies they implement. Third, we assume win = wout, so that wages in the public sector
are equivalent to wages in the private sector. Moe 2013 emphasizes that win  wout is an
important constraint in models with slackers and zealots because if win < wout slackers will
abandon the public sector, e¤ectively shutting down the government. In a model without
specialized human capital, one would expect labor markets to equilibrate to win = wout. In
fact the empirical literature o¤ers no consensus whether a wage di¤erential prevails between
the public and private sectors (see Bradley 2012 and U.S. Government Accountability O¢ ce
2012). Given the assumption win = wout, we normalize both to 0 (so win = wout = 0) to
focus on policy-induced quitting. We return briey to the subject of wages in Section V.








. Finally, we assume bureaucrats are forward-looking and
make career decisions in the shadow of the future while the incumbent president perceives
"the future is now," that is, focuses only on payo¤s in the current period. Both positions
nd support in empirical studies.5
C. Commentary
Three features of the model deserve brief discussion. First, moving the setting of Aghion
and Tirole 1997 into policy space structures the preferences of the principal (the President)
and zealous agents (the Bureaucrat) in a strong way with substantive import. E¤ort choices,
recommendation strategies, and career decisions vary across the four regions and the hostile
president conguration.
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Second, costly information transforms the strategic relationship between the principal
and the agent in a very particular way. When the President is informed, he can impose policy
on the agency like the actor in a dictator game, as in the standard analysis of presidential
unilateral action (Howell 2003). But when the President is not informed and the Bureaucrat
is informed, the Bureaucrat acts like the monopoly agenda setter in a Romer-Rosenthal
take-it-or-leave-it (TILI) game (Romer and Rosenthal 1978). This means the Bureaucrat
can force on the President her most-preferred policy among all those the President is willing
to accept over the status quo. Thus, costly information places the President and Bureaucrat
into a competitive situation structured strategically by the poles of a dictator game and a
TILI game.
Third, the presence of both slacker and zealous bureaucrats makes di¤erential exiting
important, for the exit of zealous bureaucrats can have severe consequences for future policy
initiative in the agency. The importance of di¤erential exits stands in contrast to Aghion
and Tirole 1997 where the homogeneity of agents makes quitting uninteresting, as noted
there. In this respect, our model resembles Gailmard and Patty 2007 which also incorporates
heterogeneous agents and where di¤erential exits are consequently important.
IV. Policy Centralization and Agency Response
We begin by analyzing administrative policy making between a Bureaucrat and a Pres-
ident who is unconstrained by Congress, e.g., a unied party President. (We briey discuss
the implications of constraints on sustainable unilateral actions in Section V.) Our discussion
focuses primarily on action in Period 1 when the shadow of the future a¤ects the stay/go
decision of the Bureaucrat. To appreciate the impact of the shadow of the future, however,
one needs an understanding of play in Period 2.
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A. Summary of Play in Period 2
Appendix A provides a formal analysis of play in Period 2. Summarizing, in Period 2 the
President always imposes his most-preferred policy if he is informed. If R is uninformed he
is willing to accept Bs most-preferred policy as a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er if Bs ideal point
lies in Regions 1-3. But an uninformed R will not accept a Region 4 Bs most-preferred
policy. An uninformed R will accept the compromise policy most-preferred by a Region 4
B, a policy a¤ording R a utility equivalent to the status quo (xB2 = 2r). L is unwilling to
accept any policy B prefers to the status quo.
These basic facts about policy choice have strong implications for Bs career decisions
in Period 2 as well as both partieswork e¤orts. In particular, the Bureaucrats stay/go
decision is simple: the Bureaucrat stays if the Presidents policy choice is as good or better
than the status quo; otherwise, B departs in order to mitigate the sting of complicity in a
bad policy. As a result, when the Presidents policy making e¤ort fails, B stays in public
service, since either q prevails or (even better under an R president) an informed B gets to
shape the policy in a favorable way. However, if B faces L and the President succeeds in
his policy search, L imposes xF = ` and B exits. In addition, when an R President is in
power, a very moderate B (a B in Region 1) exits if Rs policy making succeeds, since the
Presidents ideal policy r is worse for B than the status quo. More extreme Bs (those in
Regions 2-4) stay even when the R president succeeds, because they prefer the Presidents
policy over the status quo.
The work e¤ort chosen by the Bureaucrat anticipates her subsequent stay/go decisions.
In addition, the work e¤orts of both players reect the strategic interaction of their joint
policy making. Critically, the work e¤orts for R and B are strategic substitutes in the sense
of Bulow, Geanakoplous, and Klemperer 1985: additional e¤ort from one party reduces the
marginal return on e¤ort exerted by the other party. (We explore the implications when
discussing work e¤ort in Period 1). The interaction of L and B is even more stark: because
L will not accept any policy preferred by B over the status quo, B undertakes no work e¤ort.
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Hence, L has to "go it alone."
B. Career Choice in Period 1: The Stay/Go Decision
To make her career decision in Period 1, the Bureaucrat compares two alternatives:
on the one hand, the payo¤ from remaining in government service in Period 1 plus the
continuation value V (0) of the game in Period 2 given a stay decision in Period 1 (g1 = 0); on
the other hand, the payo¤ from leaving government service in Period 1 plus the continuation
value V (1) of the game in Period 2 given an exit from government service in Period 1 (g1 = 1).
For bureaucrats in all regions, the continuation value V (1) from departing in Period 1 is 0.
This reects the clean hands e¤ect on the value of future policy plus the fact that B will not
undertake costly policy making initiative in the future if she is no longer employed in the
government.
Formally, the Bureaucrat departs if and only if:
 B(xF1 ; g = 0) + V (0) <  
B(xF1 ; g = 1) + V (1) = 0
implying "depart" if and only if
(1)   B(xF1 ; g = 0) > V (0)
In words, the Bureaucrat departs if the loss from implementing the selected policy is
greater than the continuation value of the game.
Figure 2 illustrates the stay/go calculation (discussed momentarily). In the panels, the
dark line displays the continuation value V (0) to a zealous B from staying in Period 1 (see
Table 1 in Appendix B). The four regions are distinctly visible in the gure. An important
fact to note is that Bs continuation value from staying is positive regardless of region (this
is easily seen in the Figure). The reason for this is simple: the continuation value reects
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optimal e¤ort and optimal quitting in Period 2. In Period 2, B can always guarantee herself
utility of zero by not working and quitting so that in expectation any other optimal course
of action must yield utility greater than or equal to zero.
The fact that V (0) is positive has important implications for Bs career decisions. First,
if the President is unsuccessful in his policy search, B remains in government whether the
President is R or L. Second, if the President is successful in his policy search the Bureaucrat
may still stay in government if the imposed policy isnt too bad and the continuation value
of the game is su¢ ciently attractive. More precisely, the only situation leading to a quit
decision in Period 1 requires  B(xF1 ) to be negative, that is, the Period 1 policy must be
worse for B than the status quo. This situation can arise in only two circumstances: 1)
when a successful L imposes ` on a relatively moderate B, or 2) when a successful R imposes
r on a very moderate B (b lies within Region 1). In that conguration, Rs policy choice
xF1 = r yields B utility 2b  r < 0 (by construction). These situations give rise to two career
dynamics, "wait them out" and "I can make a di¤erence."
Wait Them Out (WTO). If an incumbent Ls policy search succeeds he sets xF1 = `.
This unattractive policy imposes an immediate loss of  ` on B: B can mitigate this loss
by quitting and retaining clean hands. Nonetheless, B may choose to remain in government
and su¤er the loss if V (0) >  ` (from Equation 1). In words, B will wait them out if the
prospect of participating in attractive policy making in a future R administration is large
enough to o¤set the immediate loss from Ls policy.
The left-hand panel in Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of B in the face of a successful
L president. The dark line in the gure is the continuation value V (0); the gray line is the
immediate loss  ` from Ls imposed policy xF1 = `. In the example in the gure, all Region
1 and 2 bureaucrats exit, as do many Region 3 bureaucrats. However, a portion of Region
3 bureaucrats and all Region 4 bureaucrats remain. These bureaucrats decide to wait out
the opposition President and remain in government service despite the unattractive policy
imposed on them. They do so in the hope of serving under an R president next period.
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Figure 2: The Stay/Go Calculation in Period 1. The dark line is the continuation value of
the game if the Bureaucrat stays, V (0): The gray line is the immediate loss from staying
given a presidentially imposed policy. B stays if the former is greater than the latter. The
left-hand panel shows the "wait them out" calculation. The right-hand panel shows the "I
can make a di¤erence" calculation.
From inspection of V (0) (see Table 1 and Equation 1) the comparison of present losses
and future gains is more likely to result in waiting them out when 1) R is more likely to be
elected ( is higher) and 2) L is less extreme (j`j is smaller). Both results are intuitive.
I Can Make a Di¤erence (IMD). If an incumbent Rs policy search succeeds,
he sets xF1 = r, an attractive policy for Bureaucrats whose ideal policy falls in Regions
2-4. Consequently they remain in government in Period 1. But Bureaucrats in Region 1
face an immediate loss from Rs policy choice, of size 2b   r. Nevertheless, they may stay
in government in order to have a chance to set policy themselves in Period 2 under an
unsuccessful R. In other words, they reason I can make a di¤erence in the future. This
calculation requires V (0) > r   2b (using Equation 1). The comparison of V (0) and r   2b
is shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 2. Remark 10 in Appendix B shows that a small
group of Region 1 Bureaucrats near the boundary of the region (that is, near r
2
) will not
quit. Remark 11 in Appendix B shows that this small group of Region 1 stayers is somewhat
larger when 1) R is more likely to be elected president in the future (because then Rs search
may fail and B can achieve her most-preferred policy), 2) when b is closer to the boundary
r=2, and 3) when R is less extreme, so r is less painful for B.
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Figure 3: Reaction Functions in Period 1. In each panel, the reaction function of the
President is shown as a dashed line while that of the Bureaucrat is a solid line. In all three
panels r = 3
4
. In the left Panel, b = 1
4
; in the middle panel b = 1; in the right pane b  3
2
.
Three broad themes stand out about career choice in Period 1. First, not surprisingly
but importantly, policy extremity by an opposing incumbent president impels exits by zealous
bureaucrats, at least if the President is successful in his policy search. Second, and also not
surprisingly, good election prospects for the same side President encourage policy-sensitive
bureaucrats to remain in government. And, this is true regardless of which president is
incumbent. Third, almost all Region 1 zealous bureaucrats exit if the President is successful
regardless of the presidents party.6
Together, these results imply that if presidents are ideologically extreme relative to
many bureaucrats, the bureaucratstenure in government may well be short, especially if
presidents exert much policy e¤ort.
C. Presidential E¤ort and Bureaucratic Initiative
Figure 3 displays the reaction functions in e¤ort of R and B in Period 1 (see Equations
B1-B3 in Appendix B). These functions show how each actors choice of policy e¤ort responds
to that of the other actor. The critical feature of the e¤orts exerted by the Bureaucrat and
R is that they are strategic substitutes: an increase in the policy making e¤ort of one party
reduces the marginal return on e¤ort for the other party and thus creates an incentive to
reduce its e¤ort. Consequently, the reaction functions in Regimes 1, 2, and 3 are negatively
sloped (panel 1 and 2 of Figure 3).
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In Regime 4, however, the President is insensitive to the e¤ort of the Bureaucrat. In
this conguration, if Bs search is successful, she proposes a policy that is utility-equivalent
to the status quo for the President. Accordingly, from the Presidents perspective the Bu-
reaucrats e¤ort is no substitute for his own. However, the converse is not true for a Regime
4 Bureaucrat, since e¤ort by the President can bring a better policy for the Bureaucrat.
An L president faces a very di¤erent strategic situation. There is no policy the Bureau-
crat prefers to the status quo that L does as well. Therefore, L would reject all the policies
the Bureaucrat would like to recommend. Given this fact the Bureaucrat exerts no policy
making initiative. Consequently L must go it alone.
The intersection of the two reaction functions yields the equilibrium e¤ort levels (eR; eB)
(see Equation B4 in Appendix B). Figure 4 displays the equilibrium policy making e¤orts
exerted by R and by a zealous Bureaucrat separately and jointly, as a function of the location
of b. As shown in the left-hand panel of the gure, policy making e¤ort by the Bureaucrat
increases as her most-preferred policy b is increasingly distant from the status quo q = 0, at
least in Regimes 1-3. In Regime 4, however, the Bureaucrat is constrained to recommend the
same policy while the policy making e¤ort of the President is a constant; hence, all Regime 4
bureaucrats undertake the same high level of e¤ort. R works harder than B when R is more
extreme than B, while B works harder than R when B is more extreme than R. R works
hardest when the Bureaucrats e¤ort is low (that is, when b = 0) and a successful e¤ort
by B yields a policy recommendation utility equivalent to the status quo (Region 4). In
these situations, R e¤ectively goes it alone and exerts e¤ort eR = r
2
.7 If the President were
unable to exert centralized policy making e¤ort, zealous bureaucrats in Region 1-3 would
exert e¤ort eB = b
2
while those in Region 4 would exert e¤ort eB = r.8 These "go it alone"
e¤orts for B exceed the strategic, jointly determined e¤orts for B shown in the gure. In
this sense, policy making e¤ort by the President undercuts bureaucratic initiative.
The right-hand panel in Figure 4 displays total policy making e¤ort (eR + eB) given
an R-president and zealous Bureaucrat. Total policy making e¤ort is greatest when the R
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Figure 4: Policy Making E¤ort in Period 1. The left-hand panel shows equilibrium levels of
e¤ort in Period 1 exerted by the President and Bureaucrats in the 4 regions (the Presidents
e¤ort is the dashed line while the Bureaucrats is the solid line). The right-hand panel shows
the sum of the two e¤orts. In the gure r = 3
4
.
president faces a Regime 4 Bureaucrat, for both work hard to change the distant status
quo. Total policy making e¤ort is lowest when the Bureaucrat favors the status quo (b = 0):
In this case, only the President exerts e¤ort. This situation would be compatable with
the common observation of unmotivated or "lazy" bureaucrats who force the president to
compensate for their inaction. In this situation, though, even zealots would exert little
policy initiative, because they favor current policy. Though the e¤orts of the two actors are
strategic substitutes, total policy making e¤ort is higher when both work than when only
one "goes it alone." Of course, under an an L-President, the Bureaucrat exerts no e¤ort and
the e¤ort exerted by L is a constant, the go-it-alone level j`j
2
.
With an R president, the probability of a policy departure from the status quo is 1  
(1   eR)(1   eB) (the probability at least one of the two actors is successful in nding a
policy). This quantity closely tracks total policy making e¤ort.
D. The Policy Consequences of Quitting in Protest
From the Presidents perspective, the immediate consequences of quitting in protest are
negligible. After all, the President has identied the policy he wants and slacker agents in the
agency are willing to implement it. The result is a policy the President likes and that he or
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Figure 5: The E¤ect of Policy-Induced Departures on Expected Policy. The two left-hand
panels show expected policy at the beginning of Period 1. If the Presidents policy search suc-
ceeds, the calculations shown in Figure 2 ensue and many moderate zealots depart. Expected
policy in Period 2, given a successful Period 1 president, are shown in the two right-hand
panels. Given an R president in Period 1, the policy consequences in Period 2 are very
modest. But they are dramatic given a Period 1 L president.
his party can take to the electorate. The real consequences fall on the Presidents successor.
Two cases are important: 1) when an R successor follows a successful R predecessor, and 2)
when an R successor follows a successful L predecessor.
An R President Following a Successful R Predecessor. Suppose an R president
is elected in Period 1. At the beginning of Period 1, expected policy in that period is
E(xF1 ) = e
i
1 r + (1   ei2 )eB1 xB1 , where xB1 is the policy recommendation of the Bureaucrat.
This expected policy is shown in the upper left-hand panel of Figure 5 as a function of the
location of Bs ideal policy. Not surprisingly, ex ante expected policy in Period 1 tracks
total policy making e¤ort. Recall from the earlier results that a Region 1 Bureaucrat exerts
modest policy initiative, since he does not nd the status quo particularly onerous. Hence,
expected changes in policy in that region largely reect Presidential policy making e¤orts,
which are considerable.
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But, Rs Period 1 policy search is either successful or not. If unsuccessful, B does not
exit regardless of the location of her ideal policy. However, if R is successful, he orders B to
implement the Presidents most-preferred policy, r. If Bs ideal policy lies in Regions 2-4,
she perceives this change as an improvement over the status quo. Hence, B will not exit. In
that case, expected policy in Period 2 remains the same as the ex ante expected policy in
Period 1 (the upper left-hand panel in Figure 5). But if the zealous Bs ideal policy lies in
Region 1, she will exit unless her ideal policy is very close to r=2 (this calculation was shown
in the right-hand panel of Figure 2).
What then are the implications for policy-making in Period 2 if Rs policy search suc-
ceeds? The results are shown in the upper right-hand panel of Figure 5, which displays
expected policy in Period 2 as a function of the location of b. Even if b lies in Region 1, the
impact of a policy induced departure is small. Of course, the Period 2 president must work
harder than he would have if the zealous Region 1 B had remained in government. But since
the president would have worked hard in any event, while B would not have displayed much
initiative, the impact of Bs departure is modest in terms of expected policy.
An R President Following a Successful L Predecessor. The situation is quite
di¤erent when R follows a successful L: Suppose L is elected in Period 1. Because B will
not assist L (who would not take Bs advice in any case), expected policy reects only Ls
go-it-alone e¤orts. The resulting expected policy is shown in the lower left-hand panel of
Figure 5. Again, though, Ls Period 1 policy search is either successful or unsuccessful. If
unsuccessful, B will not exit. In this case, expected policy in Period 2 is the same as that
shown in the upper left-hand panel of Figure 5. On the other hand, if Ls search is successful,
he orders B to implement Ls most-preferred policy, `. As discussed earlier, only if Bs ideal
point is rather extreme will she be willing to remain in government, hoping to "wait them
out" (recall the left-hand panel in Figure 2).
The departure of moderate zealous agents then has real impact in Period 2. The results
are shown in the lower right-hand panel of Figure 5, which displays expected policy in Period
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2 as a function of the location of b. In the example in the gure, B will depart if her ideal
policy lies in Region 1, Region 2, and the more moderate part of Region 3. Accordingly,
expected policy reects only the Period 2 presidents go-it-alone e¤ort. In the example, only
if Bs ideal policy was rather extreme (in the less moderate part of Region 3 or in Region 4)
does she stay and work in Period 2. Not surprisingly, expected policy in Period 2 is quite
di¤erent from what it would have been absent the departure (compare the lower right-hand
panel and the upper left-hand panel in Figure 5).
V. Discussion: Extensions
The preceding sections begin to build a theory of incentives in presidential-agency in-
teractions. Here we briey discuss some obvious extensions or worthwhile departures.
The Impact of Other Branches. Restrictions on presidential policymaking arise
naturally in a system of separated powers. A hostile or skeptical judiciary or a Congress held
by the opposition party can constrict the range of sustainable unilaterally imposed policies.
For example, if presidential unilateral action is to be invulnerable to a legislative reversal, the
President must locate his new policy so at least one-third of the members in a chamber will
sustain a presidential veto of legislation over-turning the Presidents unilateral action. In the
conventional analysis, this implies that the President must locate policy within the pareto
set between the median legislator and the chambers veto or libuster pivot (Howell 2003).
If the Presidents most-preferred policy lies within the relevant pareto set, as would typically
be the case in unied party government, then the Presidents ideal policy will be legislatively
sustainable. This is the scenario of the previous section. But suppose the Presidents ideal
policy lies outside that pareto set, as is common during divided party government (Cameron
2000). Then the best policy the president can sustainably achieve is the policy at the nearest
edge of the pareto set, namely, the ideal point of the relevant veto pivot. In turn, this enforced
moderation has implications for bureaucratsstay/go decisions, for policy making e¤orts by
both the president and bureaucrat, and for expected policy.9
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It is easy to see that congressional restrictions on L may benet B. First, L will not
expend as much e¤ort on policy-making, hence, he will succeed less frequently. This implies
B will not exit as frequently in Period 1 when L holds power. In addition, less extreme Bs
may be more willing to "wait them out" even in the face of a successful policy search by
L since that success will result in less extreme policies from L: The e¤ect of restrictions on
R are more complex. Given limits on sustainable policy from R; very moderate Bs (those
in Region 1) will nd it less distasteful when Rs policy search succeeds. Hence, they will
be less inclined to depart. But, extreme Bs will nd this policy less attractive. This will
reduce their continuation value of the game in Period 1, making them more responsive to
bad policy imposed by L.
Space prevents a full consideration of separation of powers e¤ects on president-agency
incentives but it should be clear that a compete examination extends the earlier analysis in
straightforward ways.
Bureaucratic E¢ ciency Wages. An obvious question given the adverse e¤ects of
"quitting in protest," is: Why not pay bureaucrats enough to keep them in the government
even when they must implement policies they dislike? The required wage structure would
strongly resemble so-called e¢ ciency wages, which pay more than market-clearing wages to
valuable employees so that they do not quit in the face of occasional temptations to do so
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Here, wages would overpay Region 2-4 Bureaucrats under an
R-president (successful or unsuccessful) so that the bureaucrats do not quit in the face of
a successful L president. And such wages would overpay Region 1 bureaucrats under an
unsuccessful R president so that these bureaucrats do not quit in the face of a successful R
president.
Though conceptually simple, bureaucratic e¢ ciency wages are deeply problematic po-
litically. First, tying wages to the political orientation of bureaucrats or their agencies is
anathema to the concept of a civil service and would likely be subject to political abuse.
Second, if presidents are constrained to o¤er the same wages across agencies and employees,
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much of the extra wage bill would go to slackers who do not need e¢ ciency wages. This would
be quite costly and likely unpopular with economy-minded voters. But, the biggest sticking
point is surely the following: the necessary wage structure would require L presidents to pay
premium wages to R-side bureaucrats with the benet from decreased exits accruing to R
presidents rather than L presidents. And similarly, R presidents would need to pay premium
wages to L side bureaucrats with no immediate benet to themselves. Perhaps such a wage
structure could be sustained by a relational contract between R and L presidents; but this
thorny question deserves a closer and more acute analysis of the politics of bureaucratic wage
setting than we can o¤er here. The political economy of public sector wage setting appears
a worthwhile topic of research.
Learning-By-Doing, Investing in Human Capital, Recruiting Zealots, and
Revolving Doors. Other extensions appear promising or intriguing. First, experience
with policy making may make long-term zealots more capable than less experienced indi-
viduals. Learning-by-doing may thus lead to greater e¤ective e¤ort from agencies even in
the face of presidential centralization, but conversely imply greater relative losses from pol-
icy induced departures. Similarly, zealous bureaucrats may be willing to invest in valuable
agency-specic human capital (similarly to Gailmard and Patty 2007). Presidential central-
ization may then imply the departure not only of the most-motivated bureaucrats but the
most skilled ones as well. On the other hand, the ability to recruit new zealots may partly
o¤set policy-induced departures, at least over time. Finally, the market for ex-bureaucrats 
the revolving door appears quite under-studied and could interact with centralized policy
making in important ways. All these topics appear reasonably tractable as extensions to the
analysis here.
VI. Conclusion
Presidential scholars have long recognized incidents like the following:
 Following President Nixons centralization of foreign policy and Henry Kissingers
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ascendancy as National Security Advisor in theWhite House, morale in the State Department
plummeted and key aides including some in the NSC quit in protest (Burke 1992, 132).
 In the wake of President Obamas extensive use of White House czars, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency found it more di¢ cult to recruit and retain top executives in
government (Steinzor 2012).
The analysis presented here suggests that these are not isolated ukes but instead reect
systematic long-term changes in presidential-agency relations. Our model o¤ers three insights
about the e¤ects of presidentially centralized policy making on executive agencies.
First, when presidents make policy on their own using devices like executive orders
or presidential memoranda, they undermine the incentives for bureaucrats to work hard,
display initiative, and devise policy innovations. Some bureaucrats derive satisfaction from
the opportunity to improve public policy (both relative to the status quo and their ideal
policy). Without the potential to inuence policy, these bureaucrats have less incentive to
expend e¤ort. In turn, their failure to expend e¤ort inuences the ability of government to
nd improvements to existing policies or respond to new and emerging ones, to the detriment
not just of the president but the bureaucrat as well.
Second, as in the case of Kissinger and members of the National Security Sta¤, cen-
tralized presidential policymaking can lead bureaucrats to quit in protest. When presidents
make policy unilaterally, they often override advice from the agency and sometimes impose
changes opposed by agency employees. As a result, bureaucrats may leave rather than be
implicated in the administration of the policy. The principal exception (according to the
model) is a class of very extreme zealots who will be willing to wait out presidents. These
bureaucrats are willing to wait out bad times in anticipation of a president from their own
party and the policies that will result from that presidents election. In addition, a relative
handful of moderate bureaucrats may be willing to put up with an extreme president from
their own party in the hope that they might have a moderating inuence on his policies in
the future.
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With these exceptions, the general prediction for many ranges of bureaucratic pref-
erences is that bureaucrats who care about policy will resign when a hostile president is
elected and engages in unilateral policymaking. Regular electoral turnover over time can
systematically remove from government the kinds of bureaucrats who seek out innovations
and improve policy, except perhaps in the most extreme agencies. These departures can
have adverse long term consequences for the quality of policymaking. If presidents from
both parties use centralized policymaking processes, there can be a signicant decline in the
competence and initiative of the permanent government.
Third, the e¤ort and career decisions of bureaucrats will be inuenced by whether
presidents succeed in setting policy on their own. Some presidents will try but not succeed.
They will expend e¤ort to craft an innovation yet fail to fashion an acceptable one. In
addition, because the capacity of the White House sta¤ is nite and the attention of the
President limited, the White House might not even try to move unilaterally. In these cases,
even hostile bureaucrats will stay on in the hope of a more receptive administration in the
future. For large swaths of the government, bureaucrats may continue from administration to
administration expending little e¤ort to improve policy but not departing either. They await
the opportunity to pick up the policymaking task when they serve under a president with
policy views close to their own. In this sense, presidential failure can lead to bureaucratic
success.
In sum, presidents inuence policymaking in the modern administrative state by politi-
cizing agencies via appointments, but also by bypassing standing agencies. Scholars have
described how modern presidents have increasingly centralized policymaking authority in
the White House and politicized the bureaucracy (Lewis 2008; Moe 1985; Rudalevige 2002;
Weko 1995). There is a sizeable literature exploring how the politicization of the bureaucracy
inuences bureaucratic capacity (see, e.g., Derlein 1996; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Suleiman
2003). What has been missed, however, is how centralization of the policymaking process
can drive zealous moderate civil servants from agencies and undermine the long-term ability
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of the government to mount policy initiatives.
A The Game in Period 2 (Unied Party Government)
The following lemma assures that, if policy search fails, the president will not choose a
new policy at random. Let F (x), with density f(x), be the distribution of policies over the
policy space. For simplicity assume F (x) is uniform.
Lemma 1. (No Guessing Lemma) If both the Bureaucrats and the Presidents search is
unsuccessful, the President chooses no policy (so xF = q):
Proof. For the President, choosing the status quo q = 0 brings policy utility of zero.
If the policy search of both actors has failed, opting for a policy change results in the
implementation of a random draw from F (x), which is uniform on [ z; z]. For R the
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which also must be negative for
all  z < `. Hence the President chooses the status quo rather than a random policy. 
The following describes the Bureaucrats stay/go strategy in Period 2.
Proposition 2. (Stay/go Period 2) The Bureaucrats stay/go strategy in Period 2 is:
g2(x
F
2 ; b) =
8><>: 1 if  
B(xF2 ; b) < 0
0 otherwise
Proof. Bs e¤ort costs are sunk when deciding to stay or go, hence only the policy impact
of xF matters. If B quits (g = 1) her utility is 0. If she stays (g = 0) she receives  B(xF2 ):
The comparison of these two utility values determines the strategy. 
The following is a subgame perfect set of policy choices and recommendations in Period
2.
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Proposition 3. (Agency Recommendation and Presidential Policy Choice in Period 2). The
President sets nal policy
xF2 =
8>>>><>>>>:
p if is search was successful
xB if is search was unsuccessful, Bs was successful, and xB 2 [minfq; tig;maxfq; tig]
q otherwise
The bureaucrats policy recommendation is
xB2 =
8>>>><>>>>:
b if own search was successful, i = R and b < tR
tR if own search was successful, i = R and b  tR
q if own search not successful or i = L
Proof. Part 1, Presidential choice. If the Presidents search was successful, he can act as
the Dictator in a Dictator game. Accordingly, he orders the implementation of his own
ideal policy, r if i = R and ` if i = L. If the Presidents search was unsuccessful but
the Bureaucrats was successful, the President is in the position of the receiver in a Romer-
Rosenthal take-it-or-leave-it (TILI) game: he accepts any policy that is as good or better than
the status quo ( i(xB)  0. The set [minfq; tig;maxfq; tig] indicates all those policies. If the
Presidents search was unsuccessful, the Bureaucrats search was successful, but  i(xB) < 0
the President rejects the recommendation so that q prevails. From the No Guessing Lemma,
if neither search was successful the President will not choose a policy at random so the status
quo q again continues. Part 2, Bureaucrats policy recommendation. The Bureaucrat makes
her recommendation before knowing whether the Presidents search was successful. And, if
the Bureaucrat is informed, her recommendation is veriable for the President. Given these
facts and the Presidents policy choice strategy in the prior Proposition, an informed zealous
Bureaucrat has a weakly dominant strategy to make a recommendation as if she were the
proposer in a Romer-Rosenthal TILI game (the strategy is strictly dominant when eR < 1).
That is, an informed zealous Bureaucrat o¤ers the policy that maximizes  B(x) among those
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policies that the President will accept if his search was unsuccessful but Bs was successful,
namely the set of policies [minfq; tig;maxfq; tig]. The indicated o¤ers follow (see Romer and
Rosenthal 1978). If Bureaucrats search was unsuccessful the President will not accept any
recommendation from Bureaucrat other than q so Bureaucrat may as well recommend q (no
recommendation is equivalent to recommending q). Note that if P is an L-president, there
is no policy other than q that Bureaucrat could knowledgeably recommend that L would
accept so B might as well recommend q. If B is a slacker she does not care about policies
and may as well follow the indicated strategy; if the slacker undertakes no e¤ort, she can
only recommends q (which is equivalent to no recommendation). 
The recommendation strategy is e¤ectively unique in the following sense. Uninformed
bureaucrats (which will include all slackers in equilibrium) could recommend a random policy
knowing that their recommendation will be rejected by the President who will understand
that it is a random policy; but a random recommendation is thus equivalent to recommending
q.
The following Corollary indicates the path of play with respect to exits.
Corollary 4. (Equilibrium exits in Period 2) If Ps search is unsuccessful, B does not exit.
If Ls policy search is successful, B exits. If Rs policy search is successful, Regime 1 Bs
exit but Region 2-4 Bs do not.
Proof. Follows from the Stay/go Proposition and the Policy Choice Proposition. That is, if
Ls search succeeds, xF = ` and  B(`) = ` < 0 while exiting brings B a utility of 0; if Rs
search succeeds xF = r and  B(r) = 2b  r < 0 for Regime 1 B, but  B(r) = 2b  r > 0 for
Regime 3 B and  B(r) = r > 0 for Regimes 3 and 4 B. If Presidents search fails then either
Bs search fails and xF = q and  B(q) = 0 for all B (so dont exit), or Bs search succeeds
and xF = b with  B(b) = b > 0 for all B. 
Reaction Functions in E¤ort in Period 2. In light of the above results the ex-
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Using these expected utilities one may straightforwardly derive reaction functions in
e¤ort for the actors. These are:
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otherwise (i = L and/or  = 0)
Note that these values require 0  b < 2 and 0  r  1. The former is the duopoly
stability condition (see e.g., Dixit 1986). The latter is necessary to restrict eB2 in [0; 1].
B The Game in Period 1 (Unied Party Government)
We rst consider Bs expected utility conditional on the outcome of the Period 2 election






. Call this expected utility EuB2 jP . First, if L is
elected EuB2 jL = 0 since B will quit if Ls search succeeds and only q can prevail if Ls
search fails (since B will not have expended policy making e¤ort, reecting the fact that
L will not accept any policy B prefers to q). Second, if B is a slacker then her expected
utility is also 0 since she receives no utility for policy and will not exert policy initiative.
Third, if R is elected and B is a zealot, then Bs expected utility varies by region as shown
in Equation A1. Substituting equilibrium e¤orts (Equation A5) in the appropriate portions
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Table 1: Continuation Values to Bureaucrat From Remaining in Government Employment
of Equation A1 yields a zealous Bs expected utility conditional on the election of R. Via
algebra EuB2 jR are: Region 1: b
2(2 r)2









We now consider the continuation value to B at the end of Period 1. The continuation
value of the game to B at the end of Period 1 depends on her stay/go decision in Period 1
(g1). If she goes (g1 = 1), then her continuation value V (1) = 0. Similarly, if she is a slacker
she stays (g1 = 1) but her continuation value V (0) = 0. However if she is a zealot who




+ (1   )EuB2 jL. As noted




:The continuation values V (0) of
the game for zealous B are shown in Table 1.
Remark 5. In Table 1 V (0)  0:
Proof. V (0) reects optimal stay/go and work decisions by a zealous Bureaucrat in Period 2.
B can always assure herself zero net utility in Period 2 by not working and quitting for any
election realization or equilibrium policy e¤ort by R or L. Hence, any equilibrium choices
in Period 2 by B must a¤ord B expected net utility of at least 0 prior to Period 2. 




1 ; b) =
8><>: 1 if  
B(xF1 ; b) + V (0) < 0
0 otherwise
Proof. Bs Period 1 e¤ort costs are sunk at the stay/go decision, hence only the policy
impact of xF1 and the continuation value matters. If B quits (g1 = 1) her policy utility is 0
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and her continuation value V (1) = 0. If she stays (g1 = 0) she receives  
B(xF1 ) + V (0): The
comparison of these two utility values determines the strategy. 
Proposition 7. (Policy Choice and Recommendation in Period 1) Ps policy selection strat-
egy and Bs policy recommendation strategy in Period 1 are the same as in Period 2.
Proof. Given a future-is-now president, the Presidents policy choice in Period 1 must be the
same as in Period 2. In addition, no deviation from Bs Period 2 recommendation strategy
could be protable for B in Period 1, as B recommends the most protable policy that an
uninformed P will accept. Hence the earlier Proposition also describes Presidential policy
choice and Bureaucrats policy recommendation strategies in Period 1. 
Given the two previous propositions and the fact that V (0) > 0, the following corollary
is straightforward.




8><>: L is president, Ls search succeeded and j`j > V (0)R is president, Rs search succeeded, b lies in Region 1 and 2b  r + V (0) < 0
0 if
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
L is president and
8><>: Ls policy search failedLs search succeeded but j`j  V (0)
R is president and
8>>>><>>>>:
Rs policy search failed
Rs search succeeded but b lies in Regions 2-4
Rs search succeeded, b lies in Region 1 but 2b  r + V (0)  0
Proof. Recall that B will go if and only if  B(xF1 )+ V (0) < 0. Recall as well that V (0) > 0:
If L is president and Ls search failed, xF1 = q so  
B(xF1 ) = 0 and thus  
B(xF1 ) + V (0) > 0.
If Ls policy search succeeded, xF1 = ` and  
B(xF1 ) = ` < 0 for all B. So B stays or goes as
j`j > V (0). If R is president and Rs policy search failed, either xF1 = q (when Bs search
failed), xF1 = b for a successful Region 1-3 B; or x
F
1 = 2r for a successful Region 4 B. In all
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these cases  B(xF2 )  0 so  B(xF2 ) + V (0) > 0 so B stays. If R is president and Rs policy
search succeeded, xF1 = r. By construction  
B(r)  0 for all B in Regions 2-4 so for such
B  B(xF1 ) + V (0) > 0 and they stay. And, by construction,  
B(r) = 2b   r < 0 for all B
in Region 1. Region 1 B then stays or goes as 2b   r + V (0) < 0. These exhaust all the
cases. 
The corollary identies two situations in which Period 1 zealous B might quit: 1) when
L is president, Ls policy search succeeded, and ` + V (0) < 0, and 2) when R is president,
Rs search succeeded, b lies in Region 1, and 2b r+V (0) < 0:The comparative static results
in the text on when quitting is "more likely" consider the e¤ects of changes in exogenous
variables on the magnitudes of `+ V (0) and 2b  r + V (0), respectively.
Remark 9. (WTO) For b in all four regions, `+ V (0) is increasing in  and decreasing in
j`j.
Proof. From inspection of Table 1, V (0) is increasing in  in all four regions. V (0) is not a
function of ` and ` < 0 so `+ V (0) is decreasing for b in all four regions.
Remark 10. (IMD) A small group of bureaucrats in Region 1 do not exit when Rs policy
search succeeds.
Proof. In Region 1 the stay condition after a successful R imposes xF1 = r is 2b   r +
V (0)  0:Recall that in Region 1 V (0) = b2(2 r)2
(4 b2)2 : Note that limb! r2






(16 r2)2  > 0, so as b approaches the upper bound of Region 1 (r=2) there is a group of
bureaucrats who do not exit. A closed form solution for b such that b   r + V (0) = 0 is
intractable but numerical solutions indicate that for plausible parameter values the range of
staying bureaucrats is very small. 
Remark 11. (IMD) For b in Region 1, 2b   r + V (0) is increasing in , increasing in b,
and decreasing in r.
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(4 b2)2  0; @@b(2b   r +
b2(2 r)2
(4 b2)2 ) = 2 +
2b(4+b2)(2 r)2
(4 b2)3  > 0; and
@
@r
(2b   r + b2(2 r)2
(4 b2)2 ) =
 1  2b2(2 r)
(4 b2)2  < 0:
We now consider expected utilities in Period 1 in order to derive reaction functions.
Assume an R president. Recall we assume a zealous B in Period 1. From above, B in
Regions 2-4 will not quit in Period 1. Hence, prior to undertaking e¤ort, the expected utility





1 ; r; b) =
8>>>><>>>>:


























if b is in Region 4
For B in Region 1 there are two possibilities: 1) If R is successful, B exits; 2) If R is





1 ; r; b) =
8><>: e
R








if Region 1 B stays when R succeeds 
1  eR1



































if b is in Region 4
Assume an L president. For B there are two possibilities: 1) If L is successful, B exits;





1 ; `; b) =
8><>: e
L




if b stays when L succeeds 
1  eL1














Using these expected utilities one may straightforwardly derive reaction functions in
e¤ort for the actors. These are:
(B1) eB1 (e
i




if i = R and b is in Regions 1, 2, or 3
(1  eR1 )r if i = R and b is in Region 4
0 if i = L
(B2) eR1 (e
B




if b is in Regions 1 and 2
r eB1 (2r b)
2
if b is in Region 3
r
2
if b is in Region 4
(B3) eL1 (`) =
j`j
2
The reaction functions ei(eB) and eB(ei) (Equations A2 , B2and B3) may be solved






























otherwise (i = L and/or  = 0)
As in Period 2, these values require 0  b < 2 and 0  r  1.
Expected policy in a period is simply ei2 p+(1 ei2 )eB2 xB2 and may readily be calculated
using the above results.
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1Shear, Michael D., Julia Preston, and Ashley Parker. 2014. Obama Plan May Allow
Millions of Immigrants to Stay and Work in U.S.New York Times, November 13, 2014
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/us/obama-immigration.html, last accessed January
23, 2015).
2This stylized "peek-a-boo" technology conveniently sidesteps di¢ cult problems of infor-
mation expropriation and policy learning that arise in spatially-based principal-agent models.
Callander 2011 provides a discussion and o¤ers an alternative approach.
3We assume all zealous bureaucrats in an agency have the same ideal policy. If one zealot
with ideal point b prefers to depart, all other zealots in the agency will as well. Hence, the
replacement must be a slacker.
4These are Matthews-normalized utility functions, a normalization which proves ex-
tremely convenient here (see Matthews 1989).
5On forward-looking bureaucrats see inter alia Lewis 2008; on the present orientation of
presidents, see Light 1982 and Lowi 1985.
6If L is su¢ ciently close to 0, then fewer Region 1 zealous bureaucrats will quit after
the L presidents search is successful, than after the R presidents search is successful. The
relevant conditions are: 1) V (0) + `  0 and 2) V (0) + ` > V (0) = 2b  r, for 0  b < r=2.
Because V (0) is so small for Region 1 bureaucrats, the rst requirement is quite stringent.
7See Equation B1 in Appendix B.
8This is easily seen using Equation B1 in Appendix B.
9There is an additional scenario in which r < vr (where vr denotes the ideal policy of
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the veto pivot) so the President is not constrained by Congress but some Region 3 and 4
Bureaucrats may be, if the presidents policy search fails but theirs succeeds.
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